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“Employment until the end of the world”: Exploring the role of 
manipulation in a Mozambican land deal  
 
Abstract 
In recent years, there has been considerable controversy over the poverty and livelihood impacts of 
large-scale land acquisitions (LSLAs) on small-scale farmers in sub-Saharan Africa. However, while 
much of the concern over LSLAs has stemmed from the phenomenon of coercive expulsion of 
farmers from their lands, far less attention has been paid to the mechanism of manipulation, which 
is arguably a subtler and more pervasive form of influence over smallholders when they are 
incorporated into major land deals. This article addresses this theoretical and empirical gap through 
a case study of a LSLA implemented by an international paper and pulp company for the 
development of an extensive eucalyptus plantation in central Mozambique. The findings highlight 
the roles of three forms of manipulative influence – namely deception, pressure to acquiesce and 
playing upon people’s emotions – that were evident during company-smallholder negotiations and 
the impacts that these had on farmers’ livelihoods. The article concludes that, in the study of LSLAs, 
a much wider range of influences should be taken into consideration during the implementation of 
land deals than is currently the case. This is particularly important when external investors seek to 
develop new markets for land in which small-scale landholders can engage on a supposedly 
voluntary basis in search of jobs and income.  
 
Keywords: Large-scale land acquisition; expulsion; manipulation; livelihoods; Mozambique.   
 
1. Introduction  
Since the global economic crisis of 2008, the poverty and livelihood effects of large-scale land 
acquisitions (LSLAs) implemented by international corporations in developing countries have 
become a topic of considerable interest amongst researchers, policymakers and civil society 
organisations. To date, much of the concern surrounding LSLAs has been based on what can be 
characterised as an expulsion-resistance narrative, according to which small-scale farmers are 
displaced from their lands, often by coercive means, with the result they engage in some kind of 
confrontation with, or resistance to, the activities of the external investor (Borras and Franco, 2012). 
However, while the expulsion of farmers from their lands does undoubtedly take place in some 
cases, it has also been pointed out that not all LSLAs necessarily result in eviction, and that not all 
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farmers might seek to resist, or be unable to profit from, large-scale land deals (Mamonova, 2015). 
Instead, there might occur a process of negotiation between farmers and external investors in which 
smallholders seek inclusion in LSLA projects from which they aim to profit financially. In this latter 
case, there is need for better understanding of how small-scale farmers are incorporated into large-
scale agricultural development projects and what the consequences of these social processes might 
be for them (Wolford et al., 2013).  
 
The aim of this article is to help address this need by demonstrating the importance of manipulative, 
rather than coercive, influence in understanding how LSLAs proceed and the impacts that they have 
on small-scale farmers. To date, manipulation has been given little systematic consideration in the 
study of LSLAs, a trend reflected by the wider philosophical and political literature on influence and 
power, in spite of its potentially pervasive existence in daily life (Coons and Weber, 2014). This 
article addresses this theoretical and empirical gap through presentation of a case study of a LSLA 
implemented by an international paper and pulp company for the development of an extensive 
eucalyptus plantation in central Mozambique, a project which begun 2009 and continues to this 
present day. Through a series of semi-structured interviews with key informants and small-scale 
farmers carried out in 2015 and 2016, the article explores the main ways in which manipulative 
influence was evident in company-smallholders negotiations, and what effects these processes had 
on farmers’ livelihood activities. It takes a rational-choice approach in which the material gains and 
losses that are perceived and anticipated by small-scale farmers as a result of their engagement in 
LSLAs form the focus of the analysis, although this does not necessarily exclude other potential social 
and cultural reasons for why farmers might hold on to or give up their land. This remains open to the 
possibility of farmers exercising agency and choice in their dealings with external actors (Long and 
Long, 1992) but also places these choices in the context of wider global economic relations that have 
historically served to marginalise small-scale farmers in the production process (McMichael, 2012).  
 
In this way, the article advances three main reasons for why differentiating between coercion and 
manipulation in the implementation of LSLAs is a fruitful realm of study. The first is that a focus on 
coercion alone will likely only include a relatively small number of LSLA cases and exclude others that 
are producing significant effects on the livelihoods of small-scale farmers but fall short of outright 
compulsion. Manipulation is a more pervasive form of influence than coercion alone (Coons and 
Weber, 2014) and thus more central to farmers’ experiences of engaging in LSLAs. It is necessary, 
therefore, to explore in greater depth than has been undertaken in the past what these experiences 




Second, consideration of manipulation allows a more nuanced exploration of the power dynamics 
involved in the spaces between conventional coercion-resistance dichotomies during 
implementation of LSLAs. Manipulation thus helps provide a theoretical lens and vocabulary to more 
effectively cut through the rhetoric of voluntariness and choice that external land companies often 
utilise when dealing with small-scale farmers, thus exposing and explaining a wider range of 
decisions and outcomes than would otherwise be the case. To this end, the article’s case study 
demonstrates the presence of three forms of manipulation – deception, pressure to acquiesce and 
playing upon people’s emotions – which, while effective in meeting company objectives to plant 
trees, ended in widespread frustration amongst those farmers who had decided to lease land to the 
external investor.  
 
Third, consideration of manipulation is helpful in highlighting the processes and effects of rural class 
differentiation. The case study examined in this article illustrates how the external investor took 
different approaches to different groups of farmers depending on the amount of land that they 
owned: better off farmers in ownership of more hectares were encouraged to lease their land in 
exchange for agricultural inputs whereas poorer small-scale farmers were offered the opportunity to 
sell their labour only.  
  
The remainder of this article is divided into two parts. In the next part, the article expands upon 
what the expulsion-resistance narrative is, before introducing the concept of manipulation. Here, 
following the approach taken by Coons and Weber (2014), the term manipulation is presented in its 
descriptive sense, as a way of better understanding the means through which LSLAs are 
implemented and what the outcomes for small-scale farmers are, rather than necessarily as a 
method to denote actions that are deemed to be morally problematic. In other words, the primary 
intention is to comprehend a social process rather than to pass judgement on the ethical status of 
any particular organisation or individuals. In the second part, the case study from Mozambique is 
introduced and the empirical findings presented: these explore how the external investor attempted 
to incorporate small-scale farmers into its plantation project and illuminate the ways in which 
manipulative influence was exerted over landholders as part of this process. A key purpose here is to 
present the views and perceptions of small-scale farmers themselves so that their voices can be 
brought into ongoing debates surrounding the effects of LSLA projects.   
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2. LSLAs: from expulsion-resistance to inclusion/exclusion  
Although varying in its processes and effects, the expulsion-resistance narrative can be explained in 
terms of two main components. The first component concerns where companies choose to target 
their investments, and the discourses and practices that surround these choices. Proponents of 
LSLAs have often claimed that there are large areas of land in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere that 
are idle, unused or marginal in nature, relatively unpopulated, and thus ready  for commercial 
exploitation by external investors (Nalepa and Bauer, 2012). For example, a widely-cited study 
produced by Cai et al. (2011) claimed that there was a total of 66 to 314 million hectares of 
“abandoned and degraded cropland” (p.334) potentially available for biofuel crop production in 
Africa alone.    
 
Statistics such as these have helped set the conditions necessary for making land a suitable target for 
financial investment in the first place, part of what Li calls “the global land assemblage” (2014). 
However, as the pace and scale of investments have grown, claims that most LSLAs are indeed being 
targeted towards unused or idle land have increasingly been questioned. For example, Messerli et al. 
(2014), using a sample of 139 land deals from around the world, showed that approximately one 
third of these had been aimed at “densely populated and easily accessible areas”, an observation 
which “substantiates case study-based criticism that the assumption about land deals targeting 
mostly idle or unused land is fundamentally flawed” (p.457). According to Exner et al. (2015), the 
language concerning unused and marginal land is rather a part of a set of state-bureaucratic or 
capitalist-economic narratives which aim to exclude “user-groups deemed irrelevant for national 
development” and “what is not profitable” respectively (p.652).  
  
The second component of the expulsion-resistance narrative concerns what happens when LSLAs 
take place in fertile areas that are easily accessible and densely populated. Although the outcomes 
of LSLAs for the different stakeholders involved inevitably vary on a case-by-case basis, the one that 
has raised most concern is the phenomenon of dispossession through accumulation: a process 
whereby capitalist expansion results in the centralisation of wealth and power in the hands of a 
small number of individuals by dispossessing the public of their resources (Harvey, 2004). In this 
way, small-scale farmers can be coerced or forced off their lands to make way for large-scale 
plantations, a form of ex situ displacement (Feldman et al., 2003). For example, Feldman and Geisler 
(2012) have documented how, in Bangladesh, land grabs have commonly taken place in the form of 
physical appropriations. Faced by these expulsion processes, many small-scale farmers will attempt 
to prevent the LSLA projects from going ahead, either through open protest, as has occurred, for 
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example, in response to Special Economic Zones in India (Levien, 2012), or via more subtle 
expressions of resistance, such as those documented in Scott’s (1985) well-known work, Weapons of 
the Weak.   
 
The notion of expulsion-resistance is important because it exposes the deeply unjust nature of global 
land-grabbing and shows how local communities might attempt to fight back. In recent years, these 
ideas have been explored in a wide range of empirical studies. As a result, understanding of how 
LSLAs proceed and their effects have been extended in three main ways. First, there is growing 
understanding that, although international corporations play a central role in LSLAs, there is a much 
wider range of actors operating in the land investment sphere than has conventionally been 
assumed. Most significant of these is the state itself, which, according to Wolford et al (2013), has 
often been portrayed as a victim of international LSLA projects when, in fact, its role is normally far 
more complex than this, with many governments acting as “active, calculating partners” (p. 192) in 
bringing land deals about and, in the process, evoking different kinds of powers within the state, 
such as the military, the police and the courts, sometimes acting in collusion with the external 
investor and other times taking a more oppositional stance. In addition, there often exists a set of 
non-state actors – so-called middlemen (Sud, 2014) or development brokers (Bierschenk et al., 2002) 
– who play an important role in shaping and facilitating land deals on the ground. Consideration of 
this wider set of actors, in addition to the actions of external corporates alone, is important if the full 
picture of LSLA drivers and effects is to be gained.   
 
Second, it has been increasingly documented that, rather than simply rejecting LSLAs outright, the 
motives and interests of small-scale farmers can be highly varied, which results in smallholder 
reactions ‘from below’ being complex and differentiated (Borras and Franco, 2013). In particular, as 
Li (2011) argues, rather than seeing external investments as simply threats to their ways of life, some 
farmers might view them as offering new opportunities, particularly in rural areas that have long 
been neglected by government services. In this way, struggles by farmers for better terms of 
incorporation into large-scale land deals can be just as significant as struggles against them (Hall et 
al., 2015). These ideas have been explored empirically by McCarthy (2010), who demonstrated a 
wide range of livelihood outcomes amongst small-scale farmers following the expansion of an oil 
palm plantation in Sumatra, Indonesia, depending upon the terms under which smallholders were 




Third, researchers have begun to explore the different ways in which external investors attempt to 
legitimise their LSLA projects in the face of potential bottom-up resistance. One common approach is 
to couch land acquisitions in the language of voluntariness whereby small-scale farmers and external 
companies are engaged in seemingly fair and transparent mechanisms of land exchange via the 
market. Such mechanisms might work for those farmers who are better educated and relatively well 
informed about the true value of their land. However, is it also the case that market-based 
mechanisms might be used to obfuscate a range of questionable practices, including coercion. This 
idea is explored in depth by Schmidt-Soltau and Brockington (2007) who showed how, in the case of  
conservation-linked resettlement projects, there is a risk that the language of voluntariness adopted 
by external investors might be used as cover under which to “freeride on the poorest and most 
marginalised segment of the global community” (p.2196).    
 
There is little doubt that the idea of the market holds strong ideological power through which land 
deals can progress. Nevertheless, there is also recognition that, due to the highly political nature of 
many LSLAs, “the veiling capacity of the market’s invisible hand” (Wolford et al., 2013;196) might be 
insufficient and so “an extra burden of ideological legitimation” can be required “as the state must 
explicitly justify to the dispossessed and to the public at large why it is expropriating property from 
one group for the benefit of another” (Levien, 2013;383). In this way, according to Kröger (2014), 
forest plantation expansion has occurred around the world via,  
 
“The creation of pro-[plantation] territorial, social and symbolic spaces. Discourses are used to 
create the symbolic spaces for [plantations], to turn them into a tool for land control that is 
hidden by their presentation as non-political, solely positive-impact tools of development. The 
positive aesthetic valuations of [plantations], if rooted amongst decision-makers and society, 
accrue honour, symbolic value, to the social actors expanding them” (pp.246-247).   
 
These insights have helped move forward the debate on LSLAs in important ways. Less critical 
attention, however, has been paid to the underlying notion of coercion itself that is often evident in 
the exclusion-resistance scenario but which might be less applicable to the more nuanced LSLA 
scenarios outlined above. While there are a number of different ways in which the ideas of coercion 
and influence might be unpacked (e.g. see Haugaard, 2009), it is suggested here that a concern with 
the incorporation of multiple actors, including small-scale farmers themselves, into land deals and 
the obfuscation processes that can accompany these processes, points us towards the concept and 




3. Manipulation and LSLAs 
Manipulation is a wide-ranging concept that that can be applied to both objects and people 
(Barnhill, 2014). In the terms of the former, manipulation expresses the operation of something in a 
skilful manner, such as the way in which a musician manipulates a violin or a scientist manipulates a 
chemical. In the case of LSLAs, the goal of the external investor is to directly manipulate the land 
that has been acquired through the use of machinery, labour or chemicals in order to generate profit 
(Fairbairn, 2014). In addition, there is a large number of other things that must be successfully and 
skilfully managed in order to turn land into a lucrative commodity, including computers and 
satellites which demarcate borders, and deeds and fences which create boundaries to exclude 
others (Li, 2014). Significantly, plantation owners are often in an advantageous position when it 
comes to the skilful manipulation of these physical elements compared to small-scale farmers. This 
can result in loss of small farms in favour of larger landholdings due to ongoing rural processes such 
as land fragmentation and degradation (Petrescu-Maga et al., 2017).    
 
The second way in which manipulation is understood, that of people, constitutes the main focus of 
this article. Wood (2014), who provides a close examination of the subject, states that manipulation 
is best appreciated when juxtaposed alongside the better-known notion of coercion, the latter being 
conceptualised in terms of the existence or otherwise of acceptable alternatives. Thus, according to 
Wood (2014), “I am coerced to do something when I either do not choose to do it or if, when I 
choose to do it, I do it because I have no acceptable alternative” (p.21). Under the expulsion-
resistance narrative then, farmers who give up lands to the external investor will either do so against 
their will or do so because there is no other feasible choice that is offered to them. According to 
Dell’Angelo et al. (2017), outcomes such as these are often characterised by the presence of “explicit 
power imbalances and absence of safeguards for more vulnerable actors” during the land deals 
process (p.4). However, far less attention has been paid to manipulation of people, which is a subtler 
and arguably more pervasive type of influence. Thus, building on the definition of coercion provided 
above, Wood (2014) states that “manipulation refers to a way of interfering with or usurping 
someone’s free agency that does not limit or destroy free choice (like coercion does) but, rather, 
influences it in certain ways that promote the outcome sought by the manipulator” (p.31). This 





According to Baron (2003), there are three basic ways in which people’s options, or their perceptions 
of them, can be affected by manipulation. The first is deception. This can involve out-and-out lying, 
such as making false promises, but might also include subtler attempts to mislead people in ways 
that do not actually misrepresent anything, including encouraging the development of wishful 
thinking, false assumptions or self-deception. Although manipulation by deception is often 
associated with a deliberate aim to misrepresent or mislead by the manipulator, Barnhill (2014) 
states that is not always the case. This is because of the difficulties involved in trying to establish the 
precise intentions of the influencer in the first place, and the tendency to presume that the 
manipulator “shares our rational ideals, that he is aware of his effect on [the manipulated], and that 
he is acting intentionally” (p.68) when this actually might not be the case.  
 
The second is pressure to acquiesce, and can involve bullying, the attrition of another’s resistance, 
and securing someone’s agreement just to avoid further humiliation or uneasiness. In addition, there 
might be subtler techniques at work such as hurrying the subject along, pushing someone ‘down a 
slippery slope’, or using the factor of surprise against them. According to Wood (2014), threats 
should also be considered to be manipulative when the harm that they threaten falls short of being 
coercive.  
 
Thirdly, manipulation can involve playing upon emotions, emotional needs, or weaknesses of 
character, a process sometimes referred to as psychological manipulation in the sense that it 
“induces changes in mental processes of the manipulated other than those involved in enhancing 
their understanding” (Barnhill, 2014;32). In addition to exploiting people’s weaknesses, this form of 
manipulation can also play upon the apparently normal tendency to defer to those in authority and 
reluctance to incur the disapproval of others. Neither is this form of manipulation always emotional 
as it is also possible to manipulate people by overloading them with information, such as by ‘blinding 
them with science’ (Goodwin, 1980).    
 
Given the different forms of manipulation outlined above, it might be expected that manipulation 
plays an important role in how LSLAs are implemented on the ground. However, there is very little 
empirical material that explicitly deals with the subject in the context of ‘land grabbing’. Perhaps the 
closest example in the literature is the idea of illusive inclusion which, according to Joseph (2012), 
occurs in social settings in which “inclusion is ensured but the outcome is not different from that of 
being excluded” (p.6). An instance of illusive inclusion is provided by Mamonova (2015) who shows 
how, in the Ukraine, a land titling programme instigated in 2001, whilst meeting the emotional 
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expectations of elderly small-scale landholders, did not lead to substantial material benefits being 
passed on to them. In addition to this case, then, what other examples might there be of small-scale 
farmers being incorporated into LSLA projects on a manipulative basis but in a manner that falls 
short of coercion? The aim of the remainder of this paper is to address this question through 
consideration of the case study from central Mozambique.  
  
4. Case study and methods  
Mozambique is one of the poorest countries in the world, currently ranked at 181 out of 188 nations 
in the UNDP’s 2016 Human Development Index (UNDP, 2016). The country has undergone periods of 
strong national-level economic growth in the past ten years but much of this has failed to translate 
into development in rural areas, which have mostly remained economically stagnant (Aabø and 
Kring, 2012). Around 75% of the population is primarily dependent on small-scale, rain-fed 
agriculture for an income, and the vast majority of farmers do not use fertiliser nor pesticide, and do 
not have access to credit. Average farm size is around 1.7 hectares but there can be considerable 
variation between households (Baez and Olinto, 2016). The poorest families tend to have the 
smallest and least favourably positioned plots of land, and the smallest number of livestock. In 
contrast, better off farmers will normally possess larger farms (up to ten hectares or more) and 
much higher numbers of livestock, and might also have access to mechanised inputs or farm labour. 
Food insecurity is a major problem across the country, with the average farming household 
struggling to produce sufficient food to feed the family during the entire year (Cunguara and Hanlon, 
2012).   
  
Mozambique has about 80 million hectares of land in total, although much of this is used for 
concessions, small-scale farming or ecological areas. Officially, all land is owned by the state, with 
the main tenets of land ownership being established in the Land Law of 1997. Under the Land Law, 
the only legally recognised form of land tenure right is the DUAT (dereito de uso e aproveitamento 
da terra). There are three ways in which an individual might secure a DUAT:   
 Customary, or traditional occupation, through inheritance. This is the major way in which land is 
owned.  
 ‘Good faith’ occupation, whereby someone has utilised land for at least ten years without 
objection.  
 Awarded on a concessionary basis by the state, following an application submitted by an 
individual or corporation for a leasehold of up to 50 years. The application must be based on an 
approved investment proposal, payment of annual rents, and a community consultation. The 
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consultation process, which is described under the Diploma Ministerial no. 158/2011, should 
occur over two main phases and involve a range of actors, including the district administrator or 
their representative, a representative of the land registry services, the external land investor 
and the landholders themselves. The outcomes of the process should also be disclosed to the 
wider community “in order to ensure [their] effective participation…in the management of land 
and natural resources”1.  
  
As of 2017, the online Land Matrix database for Mozambique shows that a total of 85 transnational 
deals have been concluded orally or via a signed contract via the DUAT system, mostly for 
agriculture or forestry. The size of these deals vary greatly, from hundreds to tens of thousands of 
hectares. It is also possible for small-scale farmers holding land in the customary manner to secure a 
DUAT by formally registering their land with the state. However, this is rarely done in practice, with 
DUAT ownership amongst this group standing at around only two to three percent (Baez and Olinto, 
2016).   
  
Mozambique’s Land Law is widely recognised as, on paper at least, one of the most progressive in 
sub-Saharan Africa and a genuine attempt to balance the interests of small-scale farmers with those 
of external investors. However, there are major challenges relating to its implementation, 
particularly with regard to the consultation process, which is often carried out poorly, if at all, with 
little information being provided to communities which are being asked to lease out land2. As a 
result, the land debate in Mozambique to date has been characterised by campaign groups mostly in 
terms of the expulsion-resistance narrative outlined above (e.g. see Beekman and Veldwisch, 2012). 
Probably the best known example of this is the highly publicised and controversial sugarcane 
project, ProCana. This consisted of 30,000 hectares of land that was contracted out by the 
Mozambican government in 2007 in Massingir District, Gaza Province (Borras et al., 2011). However, 
following widespread protests by small-scale farmers fearing the loss of their lands and civil society 
organisations, ProCana was cancelled in 2009 by the Mozambican government, citing non-
compliance with contractual clauses by the external investor.    
 
Nationally, there is a long history of eucalyptus and pine forestry concessions that dates back to the 
colonial era and, since independence, the Mozambican government has tried to attract foreign 
investment in plantations with mixed levels of success. In recent years, more than one million 
                                                          
1 For a comprehensive discussion of Mozambique’s Land Law in relation to LSLAs, see Hanlon (2011).  
2 Discussion with NGO manager, Chimoio, Mozambique, 12 August 2015.  
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hectares of land in central and northern Mozambique have been claimed by investors for forestry 
monocultures (Hanlon, 2011). The particular project being examined in this article concerns a 
company that was granted a 50-year land use license for an area of 173 thousand hectares in 
Zambézia Province and 183 thousand hectares in Manica Province for creation of eucalyptus 
plantations, the largest in the country ever undertaken. The project has received international donor 
approval, including a loan from the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of US$ 2.3 million, thus 
securing the IFC a twenty percent stake in the company.   
 
The company website states that the intervention offers “vast social and economic benefits for 
Manica and Zambézia provinces, and for the country as a whole”. It claims to be producing a total of 
7500 jobs via its investment and intends to create a factory to come into operation in the centre of 
the country by the end of 2023 to produce 1.3 million tonnes of pulp per year. There is also a 
community development component to the project, estimated at $US 40 million, which is expected 
to reach 130,000 people in Manica and Zambézia. In spite of these intended benefits, however, 
much of the response from civil society to the company has been negative, with the potential 
impacts of the project on farmers’ livelihoods and capacity to produce food being highlighted in 
particular.   
 
Manica Province, which forms the focus of this work, has an area of 62,272 km². The company’s 
concession in Manica is located in five districts, Bárue, Gondola, Manica, Mossurize and 
Sussundenga, and the fieldwork for this research took place in Gondola and Sussundenga. These two 
districts were purposively selected in order to represent different farm types under the same LSLA 
project. In Gondola, there are 598 families located inside the company concession, organised into 
five villages. Farm sizes in Gondola are typically small, being one to two hectares each, and many 
families in the area are relative newcomers, having moved to the district following the cessation of 
the county’s civil war in the early 1990s. Many farmers practice shifting agriculture, working in the 
same plot for three years before moving on to the next, and formal registration of land under the 
DUAT system is very rare. In addition to farming, families use their lands for a range of other 
purposes, including animal grazing, charcoal production, grass collection for house construction, and 
honey production.   
 
In Sussundenga, the company’s concession extends across three districts and 36 farming households 
have been directly affected by plantation activities. Farms in the districts are generally larger 
establishments in comparison to Gondola, typically being 5-20 hectares each. This is due to the fact 
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that, unlike in Gondola, Sussundenga has long been a focus of large-scale farming operations 
extending back to the colonial era. Many Mozambican farmers resident in the district were involved 
in colonial farming operations as agricultural managers and therefore inherited land when the 
Portuguese left in 1975. Most of the larger, better-off farmers in Sussundenga possess DUATs and 
have access to hired labour, but they can also lack access to inputs such as mechanisation, fertilisers 
and pesticides.   
 
Fieldwork in Manica Province took place over two periods of three weeks each in August 2015 and 
April 2016. A total of 15 semi-structured interviews with key informants were carried out in the 
provincial capital, Chimoio, during which a range of issues concerning rural development, LSLAs, 
forestry plantations and small-scale farming were discussed. Key informants were purposively 
sampled using a snowballing technique and constituted eight representatives of rural development 
NGOs, three academics, two stakeholders from Chimoio’s business community, and two company 
employees. In addition, 20 group-based interviews of two or three people at a time were carried out 
with farmers who had leased land to the company (14 in Gondola and six in Sussundenga) to discuss 
their livelihoods and interactions with the company. Three interviews were also conducted with 
small-scale farmers who had, for various reasons, refrained from leasing land to the company. 
Roughly equal groups of men and women, leaders and non-leaders, and old and young were 
selected, with individuals being sampled in consultation with local stakeholders in order to ensure 
that a range of social groups were represented. Secondary data were also collected including reports 
produced by the company, provincial and district government, and NGOs based in the region.  
 
All research was carried out subject to approval by the standard ethical research procedures 
established at the author’s home institute, and in Mozambique established procedures were 
followed at provincial, district and village levels in order to gain access to respondents. Interviews 
were conducted in the local language, Sena, for which an experienced translator was hired and 
trained in the objectives of the research. Discussions were recorded during meetings and then 
transcribed into Word immediately afterwards. The researcher also kept a field dairy in which 
observations, thoughts, feelings and ideas were recorded as the research progressed. In addition, 
data collection benefitted from informal discussions and observations that occurred through visits to 
affected communities, with insights gained from these also being recorded in the field diary for later 




5. LSLAs and manipulation: voices from the grassroots 
This section draws on the empirical data to explore the evolution and effects of the company’s 
project in central Mozambique. Section 5.1 places the development of the project in light of the 
debates outlined in section 2 to explain how and why the company attempted to negotiate access to 
land on a plot-by-plot basis. Section 5.2 examines farmers’ claims that the benefits of the LSLA had 
been misrepresented, or that they were misled during their negotiations with the company during 
their incorporation into the project. Section 5.3 shows how people’s attitudes towards the 
company’s presence and actions were influenced.  
 
5.1 Negotiations on a one-to-one basis  
The company’s first step in Mozambique was to obtain approval for its project in the national 
capital, Maputo, from the Mozambican government via a Council of Ministers Resolution of 19 
December 2011. From Maputo, the company then moved to the Provincial cadastral office in Manica 
to finalise the boundaries of its new concession. At the time, according to cadastral records, a total 
of 695,565 hectares of land was showing as free or empty in the Province, from which the company 
was allocated 183,000 hectares. However, when the company’s field managers travelled to the 
region that had been allotted to them for inspection, they found very large numbers of famers 
settled within the newly-granted concession. In fact, the company’s environmental and social 
baseline report stated at the time that the total number of inhabitants came to 66,831 people. Most 
of these were smallholders but there were also farmers with larger plots of land, including 
immigrants from Zimbabwe and South Africa. On discovering these farmers, the company’s 
management returned to government representatives to explain the situation, but were informed 
that the concession was no longer the government’s responsibility and that the investor would have 
to deal with the farmers. 
 
This case provides an example of how an international company, rather than securing land that is 
somehow marginal in nature, was in fact allocated land that is fertile and populated. It also 
demonstrates the central role that government played in this outcome, although the degree to 
which the company was duped in a deliberate fashion is open to debate. On the one hand, it is likely 
that the Provincial cadastral services would not have been aware of most existing agricultural 
activity taking place inside the concession. This is due to the fact that the majority of small-scale 
farmers are unwilling or unable to register their land, or unaware of the need to do so. On the other 
hand, it is possible that cadastral services were encouraged by national-level land-owning elites to 
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downplay the level of farmer occupation of the designated area in order to ensure that the deal with 
the company, from which they would personally benefit, was signed3.  
 
The company’s response to this situation was to adopt a land management system based on an 
“innovative mosaic approach” in which eucalyptus production would be developed over a period of 
12 years alongside “improvements to community farming systems, ecosystem services, and 
preservation of high conservation value areas so important to local communities”4. The mosaic 
system, then, allowed the company to avoid the problems associated with the expulsion of small-
scale farmers from their lands, presenting instead a vision of a shared space and shared benefits in 
which families could engage voluntarily with the company to negotiate land use on a one-to-one 
basis. In this way, the company committed to only planting on 70 percent of the land that it had 
been allocated, signing “land sharing agreements with communities or families wanting to join the 
project” and “ensuring they are left with enough land for their needs, and working with them to 
increase their agricultural yields and income”. The remaining 30 percent of land would act as 
designated “community spaces” which would allow the development of a “sustainable forest”.    
 
These aims required a high level of brokerage with local communities to achieve. A number of 
negotiators or middlemen, often former officials from district government, were therefore hired by 
the company to liaise directly with community leaders and farmers. This approach was intended to 
follow the community consultation process as required under the Land Law, although the extent to 
which it was fully implemented varied from district to district, with community members in some 
areas reporting that they had remained unaware that any land deals had been agreed in the first 
place until the land clearance activities of plantation development had actually begun. Overall, the 
approach taken by company representatives to negotiation was primarily determined by the 
particular socioeconomic characteristics of the farming communities that they encountered, with an 
assessment being made on a case-by-case basis concerning what should be offered in exchange for 
land. Thus:  
 Better off farmers with larger areas of land, as in Sussundenga, were commonly offered a deal 
whereby the company would commit to cultivating a certain proportion of the land (normally 
ten percent) provided to it, returning all profits generated from that cultivation to the farmer 
for a period of three years. Much of the land that was leased out in this manner was not under 
                                                          
3 Informal discussion with NGO manager, Chimoio, 5th May 2016.  




cultivation at the time as it was, due to resources constraints, beyond the abilities of individual 
farming households to cultivate.  
 Poorer farmers with smaller areas of land, as in Gondola, were commonly offered employment 
as plantation workers in exchange for land at a rate of one job for every four hectares leased to 
the company. As part of this employment package, farmers would receive protective clothing, 
tools, free healthcare and breakfast. Much of the land that was provided by small-scale farmers 
in this manner was used by them on a regular basis for crop cultivation and was considered to 
be important to their day-to-day livelihoods activities.  
 
As a result, the majority of farmers approached by the company provided a proportion of their land 
to the company. Once a deal was struck, agreements were formalised with individual farmers via an 
Acordo para uso e aproveitamento da terra (Agreement for use and improvement of land) which 
contained a description of the rights and responsibilities of both company and farmer, and was 
signed by both parties. This mechanism was intended to ensure that agreements were being arrived 
at in an open and transparent manner.   
 
Due to the need to negotiate individually with each farmer, the tree planting process progressed 
relatively slowly, with the company reporting in 2016 that it had planted 7.1 million trees on 5,300 
hectares of land, bringing its Mozambique planting to 10,000 hectares in Zambézia and 1,700 
hectares in Manica. Nevertheless, by taking this approach, some key informants believed that the 
project in Manica had occurred on an entirely voluntary basis, and that the company had done the 
right thing by avoiding the problems of the past associated with farmer expulsions and damaging 
conflicts with local communities. As one district leader commented, “Each farmer has been given a 
choice: they can lease land to [the company] or choose not to. Some can even try to grow eucalyptus 
themselves if they want, or are free to leave the area…This is the best approach that [the company] 
could have taken and we are grateful to them for doing it in this way” (KII5 4; 10/10/15).  
 
It is certainly the case that very few, if any, smallholders experienced coercive ex situ displacement 
as a result of the company’s project. Nevertheless, by 2015, levels of dissatisfaction with the 
company amongst farmers had grown considerably, with many reporting a lack of materialisation of 
benefits and difficulties maintaining their livelihoods in situ. This outcome is perhaps surprising given 
the lengths that the company went to in attempting to reach agreements with each farmer on an 
individual basis. However, such an outcome is better understood when placed in the context of the 
                                                          
5 Key Informant Interview (KII)  
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three main ways in which people’s options can be manipulated: deception, pressure to acquiesce, 
and playing upon people’s emotions. In the two sections that follows, each is considered in turn.  
 
5.2 Deceptive influence  
The vast majority of farmers interviewed believed that the investor’s negotiators had 
misrepresented the benefits that they would receive in exchange for leasing land, or that the 
company had failed to keep the promises that it had made to them. As described above, the 
company’s presence in Sussundenga provided many better-off farmers with an opportunity to 
increase the productivity of their land. However, following one season of agricultural production, the 
company suddenly scaled down its operations, claiming to have realised that producing crops for 
farmers in the manner that it had offered did not make commercial sense, and that such a system 
was encouraging idleness amongst landowners. For this reason, the company’s level of activity fell 
from ten percent in the first year to seven percent in the second year. Then, in the third year, the 
company stopped work altogether, choosing to provide cash compensation and seeds instead. The 
level of cash compensation was meant to be based on the productivity and price of the crop. 
Nevertheless, farmers in Sussundenga complained that the compensation was too little and that the 
seeds that they had been given were of poor quality.   
 
Whereas better off farmers negotiated with the company in terms of capital inputs into their 
landholdings, poorer farmers were overwhelmingly concerned with gaining employment from the 
investor. Indeed, it is well understood in Mozambique that what many rural communities desire 
most are jobs, and these are often preferred to working on the land, which can be seen as hard work 
and unprofitable. Thus, following the company’s arrival in Gondola, expectations surrounding 
employment became very high, and it was believed that the jobs provided by the company would be 
plentiful and of good quality. As one farmer stated, “We thought we would have guaranteed 
employment until the age of 50, and that if we died before this time then our children could replace 
us. We thought we’d have employment until the end of the world” (GBI6 02; 12/08/15). It was even 
reported that a small number of individuals had recently moved into the district and purchased new 
land in an attempt to gain access to employment. Moreover, it was stated during interviews that 
company representatives had encouraged people to view the land investments in an optimistic 
manner, or had facilitated the development of wishful thinking. As one academic expert on 
Mozambican agriculture explained, “Sometimes people automatically think that because it is a very 
                                                          
6 Group-based interview (GBI) 
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big investment with a lot of land, then the company must be hiring a lot of people. This is the 
assumption that people make, and the company plays on this” (KII 14; 09/04/16).  
 
In spite of farmers’ initial hopefulness, as previous field-based studies have shown (for example, see 
Chinsinga et al., 2013; Romijn et al., 2014), labour opportunities provided by large-scale plantations 
are often short-term. This was also the case in Gondola where a large number of concerns was 
highlighted by respondents. The main ones are summarised in Table 1, alongside illustrative 
quotations.   
 
Table 1: Main concerns amongst company employees in Gondola District accompanied by 
illustrative quotations  
Concern  Illustrative quotation  
People treated 
differently in an 
arbitrary manner  
“The work is very variable. Some people get a fulltime job for a whole year 
and then nothing whereas other people get low levels of part time work for 
much longer. It’s not clear why this is. We think that the work should be the 
same for everybody.” (GBI 07; 31/03/16) 
No fixed days 
(‘zero hours’ 
contracts)  
“We are just called to work with no warning. But we don’t get paid for the 
days that we do not work, even if we are sick. Last month my nephew, who 
was working for [the company] for three months, became ill and so could 
not work for two weeks. But the company did not pay him and then found 
someone else to do his job.” (GBI 17; 12/04/16) 
Declining quantity 
of work 
“I had fulltime work for the first six months, for clearing [the land] and 
planting. But now the work is decreasing as the company is using herbicides 
instead of people to clear the weeds…Sometimes the company brings in 
outside workers rather than employ local people.” (GBI 10; 02/04/16) 
Difficult work 
conditions  
“The work is hard and the pay is low. The company promised to provide us 
with protective clothing and breakfast in the morning but we never received 
these things…The company said that it would provide free healthcare but 
no one has been sent to the clinic since [the company] arrived. ” (GBI 11; 
03/04/16) 
Delays in payment  “Sometimes there are delays in payment after we have completed the work. 
We finish work but then we are told that the money is not yet available but 
it is being organised…These [delays] are up to 45 days in some cases. 
Others have worked but they have not been paid for all the days that they 
have completed.” (GBI 20; 16/04/16) 
Lack of contract of 
employment  
“The people were expecting a contract, but it did not arrive. A contract 
would be better because then we’d know what our relationship with the 
company is…We would have turned [the company] down if we knew that a 
contract would not arrive.” (GBI 15; 07/04/16)   
 
 
As a result, farmers in Gondola felt that a fair exchange with the company had not occurred. This 
sense of injustice was exacerbated by the fact that, unlike farmers in Sussundenga who were mostly 
able to continue their agricultural operations as before, the livelihoods of small-scale landholders 
were curtailed by reduced access to land. Before the arrival of the company, many farmers in 
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Gondola had used the full extent of their plots for collection of natural resources, such as charcoal, 
firewood and grass, for shifting agriculture, and for animal grazing. However, after passing land over 
to the company, access to these resources was restricted as farmers were no longer allowed to 
utilise company land. An additional concern was that the time spent working on the company’s 
plantation was time away from farmers’ own fields and that their own crops could suffer as a result. 
This problem was worsened by the fact that irregular work and pay meant that farmers were unable 
to plan ahead to manage their own farms. For example, one respondent, who owned three hectares 
of land, two of which had been leased to the company, stated, “We don’t get fixed days so we 
cannot plan to manage our own farms. We might be able to hire someone [to work on our farms], 
but we can’t plan from one day to the next” (GBI 19; 14/04/16).   
 
5.3 Manipulation of thoughts and feelings  
Section 5.2 considered a form of manipulation that aims to influence what farmers immediately 
decide or do (i.e. to lease or to not lease land to the company). However, as stated by Barnhill 
(2014), manipulation can also be aimed at changing how someone thinks or feels, without 
attempting to affect their immediate behaviour. This latter form of influence was evident in the way 
that the company and government representatives tried to shape how famers perceived the 
company through exerting pressure to acquiesce to a higher authority and by playing upon people’s 
desires for local development.   
 
In terms of the former, farming communities in both Sussundenga and Gondola reported being 
informed that the investments that the company was making were “for the President [of 
Mozambique]” (GBI 19; 14/04/16) and that the President personally wanted the company to be in 
the area. This quotation reflects an approach towards the establishment of LSLAs in Mozambique 
previously reported by Hanlon (2011), whereby project proponents “attempt to give the impression 
that they are powerful, or are sent by powerful people, or have been given decision making power 
by higher authority” or “put pressure on district administrators and local chiefs to rush through 
consultations and approvals – often saying the governor or president demands they agree” (p.46).  
 
In addition, pressure to enter negotiations with the company was placed on some farmers by 
officials from provincial- and district-level cadastral services who reminded landholders that, under 
the country’s land laws, farmers were obliged to keep all of their land productive and that, if they 
failed to do so, then the government had the right to take ‘underused’ land from them. Although the 
relative unlikeliness of this threat being carried out made it fall short of actual coercion, reminding 
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farmers of the country’s Land Law in this manner was sufficient to alter farmers’ perceptions of the 
options that were available to them. For example, João, a small-scale farmer who had leased half of 
his three hectares to the company stated, “We were reminded that all land in Mozambique belongs 
to the government and the government has the power to take it back if it’s not being used optimally. 
So we thought that it might be safer if some of it went to [the company]” (GBI 07; 31/03/16).   
 
In terms of people’s emotions, company negotiators played upon leaders’ desires for district-based 
economic development and jobs in an attempt increase the acceptability of the company’s presence 
and actions. Thus, community leaders in Gondola stated that, during initial meetings with company 
representatives, “[the company] came to us and said that it is going to be a huge benefit to the 
country and that we have the chance to play our part in helping to achieve this” (GBI 08; 31/03/16). 
This claim had greatly enhanced the acceptability of the company in the eyes of community leaders, 
although it was never specified how national-level benefits were going to accrue to improve people’s 
livelihoods at sub-district levels. Moreover, it was reported during interviews that it was frequently 
claimed by the company that investments in physical and social infrastructure, such as bridges, 
roads, schools and hospitals, would boost local economic growth, thereby facilitating further 
investment in the area. For example, in one community in Doroi, one of the company’s first actions 
was to organise a large meeting in a nearby primary school during which the company stated that its 
project would lead to the construction of a local road and bridge. However, community leaders also 
explained that this investment was not subsequently realised and no account for why this was the 
case had been provided to them.     
 
While many communities were hopeful that the benefits that company representatives had 
discussed with them would eventually materialise, most key informants had low expectations that 
they would ever arrive. For example, a prominent businessman based in Chimoio claimed that, “[the 
company] have set aside four to five million US dollars for social development but they will only 
spend a fraction of this. They are meant to be building hospitals and schools but they will still be 
planning to do this in ten years’ time” (KII 15; 16/04/16). There was a general view, then, that whilst 
the company’s project had the potential to deliver much-needed infrastructure upgrades to areas 
where the LSLA was operational, the claim that plantations would bring long-term benefits to local 
economies was a calculated measure designed to bring about a positive view of the company and its 
operations. This, it was argued, was part of an attempt to encourage people to lease out land rather 




6. Conclusion  
In Mozambique, the coercive expulsion of farmers from their lands is unlikely, given investor 
reluctance to stir up potentially damaging conflicts with farming communities. Rather, it is far more 
likely that investors planning LSLAs will talk up the benefits of their projects in terms of jobs and 
local infrastructure whilst seeking to engage in a process of negotiation with those small-scale 
farmers whose land they seek. This is particularly the case when large companies attempt to 
implement sustainable mosaic-based approaches to land management based on principles of shared 
use of the landscape. As one manager of a land governance NGO stated, “The aim is not to avoid or 
cut external investment but to make it fair – to make it win-win. Mozambique needs investment in its 
rural areas. But can it be fair?” (KII 15; 16/04/16)  
 
In this article, the evidence demonstrates that there is some to go before the types of negotiation 
processes examined can be referred to as resembling fair. Small-scale farmers were portrayed as 
being provided with a set of options concerning the quantity of land that they wished to pass on to 
the company, and being free to choose between those options based on each families’ individual 
circumstances and priorities at the time. However, through the process of manipulation, company 
representatives in Sussundenga and Gondola districts were able to influence farmers’ decisions to 
lease land, or to change how people viewed the external investor, by altering landowners’ 
perceptions of the options that were available to them. In many cases, farmers subsequently 
regretted their decisions to lease their land out but were unable to rectify their actions once work to 
establish the plantation had begun.  
 
Overall, these findings demonstrate the importance of manipulation, the form of influence that lies 
between coercion, the traditional focus of critical LSLA scholarship, and encouragement or 
persuasion based on voluntary decision-making by smallholders, which governments and external 
investors would like to be seen as facilitating. According to Milgroom (2015), there often exists in 
LSLA projects a significant gap between policy intention, such as the protection of land tenure, and 
policy in practice, the so-called “interface of politics ‘in the air’ and ‘politics on the ground’” (p.585). 
The concept of manipulation, then, can be one way of trying to understand the shape and form of 
this interface during the implementation of LSLA projects, as company representatives attempt to 
push planned land investments through towards realisation. By taking the idea of manipulation into 
account in this manner, it becomes possible to reveal more subtle, nuanced, but nevertheless 
consequential, influences over smallholders that might otherwise go unrecognised by researchers, 
policymakers and commentators. Moreover, these influences might be targeted at different social 
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groups in varying ways, thus reflecting indigenous processes of rural class differentiation, as 
illustrated by the manner in which company negotiators took different approaches to farmers in 
Sussundenga and Gondola. In many cases, better off farmers in possession of larger numbers of 
hectares were able to lease ‘excess’ land to the company whereas poorer farmers with only a few 
hectares attempted to substitute land that was central to their livelihood activities for jobs which 
sometimes did not materialise.  
 
The case study presented in this article highlights new policy challenges concerning the best way to 
deal with the potential problem of manipulation in land grabs. In recent years, international 
policymaking on LSLAs, such as the 2010 Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment 
developed by, amongst others, the FAO and World Bank, has tried to establish the importance of 
transparency, and good quality consultation and participation, as key ingredients to successful land 
deals based on win-win outcomes for all stakeholders involved, including relatively powerless 
landholders themselves. These principles were reflected in the case study presented in this article by 
the development of written contracts clearly setting out tenure rights and responsibilities regarding 
land. However, these documents said nothing about what benefits farmers were entitled to, these 
being subject to agreements arrived at on a mostly informal basis between company representatives 
and landowners. As a result, there was scope for manipulation of farmers’ expectations of those 
benefits, a situation which could have been avoided if all entitlements and benefits had been put 
into writing and an effective mechanism for dispute resolution established at the outset.   
 
All of this, of course, is not to claim that the company set out to deliberately deceive the landowners 
with which it was negotiating; this is because, as noted above, establishing the degree of 
intentionality in the case of the influencer is often difficult to determine. Nevertheless, it was 
certainly the case that the small-scale farmers interviewed in Sussundenga and Gondola believed 
that the benefits of leasing out land to the company had been misrepresented to them, or at least 
over-stated by the negotiators acting on the investor’s behalf. Interestingly, the case study also 
points to a certain degree of deception of the company itself by government representatives at the 
national level, who appeared to dupe the investor into believing that the land that they were being 
allocated for plantation development was uninhabited. This process reflects the active and 
calculating role that developing country governments can take vis-a-vis LSLA processes occurring 
within their national boundaries, a process which in Mozambique led to the company attempting to 
establish its mosaic approach to tree-planting. However, it now appears that the challenges 
presented by the situation in Manica have been too great for the company, with the decision by its 
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management in 2016 to scale back its operations in the province, concentrating 70 to 80 percent of 
its activities in Zambézia instead, where there are fewer farmers located. Whilst this news might be 
welcomed by some who have campaigned against LSLAs in general, in the context of stagnant 
economic growth and high levels of poverty in the centre of the country, it would likely be a mistake 
to dismiss the potential of large-scale plantations to deliver development altogether. Making 
transparent and addressing the problems presented by the phenomenon of manipulation would 
surely be a step in the right direction towards delivering rural investment projects in a manner that 
could be considered as something akin to fair.   
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